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Abstract
This paper shows that the various computations underlying spatial cognition can be implemented using statistical inference
in a single probabilistic model. Inference is implemented using a common set of ‘lower-level’ computations involving
forward and backward inference over time. For example, to estimate where you are in a known environment, forward
inference is used to optimally combine location estimates from path integration with those from sensory input. To decide
which way to turn to reach a goal, forward inference is used to compute the likelihood of reaching that goal under each
option. To work out which environment you are in, forward inference is used to compute the likelihood of sensory
observations under the different hypotheses. For reaching sensory goals that require a chaining together of decisions,
forward inference can be used to compute a state trajectory that will lead to that goal, and backward inference to refine the
route and estimate control signals that produce the required trajectory. We propose that these computations are reflected
in recent findings of pattern replay in the mammalian brain. Specifically, that theta sequences reflect decision making, theta
flickering reflects model selection, and remote replay reflects route and motor planning. We also propose a mapping of the
above computational processes onto lateral and medial entorhinal cortex and hippocampus.
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Introduction
This paper describes a dynamic Bayesian model of spatial
cognition. Here we define spatial cognition as including the tasks
of localisation (estimating where you are in a known environ-
ment), sensory imagery (constructing a virtual scene), decision
making (deciding which way to turn to reach a goal), model
selection (working out which environment you are in) and motor
planning (computing a sequence of motor commands that will
lead to a sensory goal). We show that all of these tasks can be
implemented using statistical inference in a single probabilistic
model. We note that the above formulation is slightly different to
previous definitions by OKeefe and Nadel [1], Gallistel [2], and
Redish [3] which stress the capacity of determining and
performing a path from a current position towards a desired
location.
The model has hidden states comprising speed, direction and
allocentric location, control variables comprising change in
direction and speed, and sensory states representing olfactory,
somatosensory and visual information. The model describes the
dynamical evolution of hidden states, and provides a mapping
from hidden to sensory states. Inference in the model is then
implemented using a common set of ‘lower-level’ computations
involving forward and backward inference over time. We propose
that these computations are reflected in recent empirical findings
of pattern replay in the mammalian brain [4,5]. Specifically, we
propose that theta sequences reflect decision making, theta
flickering reflects model selection, and remote replay reflects route
and motor planning. Our use of the terms ‘forward’ and
‘backward’ here relate to time and should not be confused with
the direction of message passing in a cortical hierarchy [6].
Our approach falls into the general category of ‘map-based’ or
‘model-based’ planning [1,7–10], or ‘model-based decision mak-
ing’ [11]. The term ‘model-based’ refers to making and updating a
representation of the world (such as a cognitive map). This is to be
contrasted, for example, with ‘model-free’ approaches in which
agents merely react to stimuli, after having previously learnt
stimulus-response mappings through extensive exposure to an
environment [12].
More generally, agents will use a variety of navigation strategies
depending on their cognitive capabilities and familiarity with an
environment. Spatial decisions can, for example, be classified [13]
as being cue-guided (eg. move towards the red house), stimulus
triggered (eg. turn left at the red house), route based (turn left at
the red house then right at the blue house). There is a good deal of
evidence showing that the brain has multiple decision making or
control systems, each with its own strengths and weaknesses [14–
16].
The usefulness of model-based planning is most apparent after
an agent has sufficient experience to learn a model of an
environment and when, subsequently, local changes to that
environment are made which affect the optimal route to a goal
[15]. In statistical terms, these would be referred to as
nonstationarities. For spatial models this could be, for example,
a hole appearing in a wall enabling an agent to take a shortcut, or
a new object appearing preventing an agent taking a habitual
route. Another strength of model-based control is that it can
reduce learning time. Tse et al. [17], for example, studied decision
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making in rats and found that learning required fewer trials when
it occurred against a background of prior knowledge. This allows
new information to be assimilated into an existing schema or
model.
The model-based versus model-free distinction has become
important for the study of decision making in general as the
underlying neuroanatomical differences are being delineated
[11,15]. Khamassi and Humphries [18] argue that, due to the
shared underlying neuroanatomy, spatial navigation strategies that
were previously described as being either place-driven or cue-
driven are better thought of as being model-based versus model-
free. Daw et al. [15] propose that arbitration between model-based
and model-free controllers is based on the relative uncertainty of
the decisions and more recently, Pezzulo et al. [19] have
embedded both types of decision making systems into a single
‘mixed instrumental controller’.
This paper describes the computations underlying spatial
cognition, initially, at a rather abstract level of manipulations of
probability densities and then employs vector and matrix
representations of variables and connectivities. Although we later
on go on to describe how our model relates to underlying neuronal
implementations, the model itself is not specified at a neuronal
level. This style of modelling has many precedents in the literature.
For example, Bousquet et al. [20] have conceived of the
hippocampus as a Kalman filter. This requires that the
hippocampus has an ‘observation model’ relating hidden states
(places specified in allocentric coordinates) to sensory cues, and a
dynamic model relating previous to current state via path
integration. Kalman filtering then refers to the forward inference
algorithm that combines path integral estimates of state with
current sensory cues to provide optimal updates of the agent’s
location. The main function of Kalman filtering in this context is
therefore one of localisation. One of the key points of this paper is
that if an agent has taken the trouble to construct a ‘dynamic
model’ and an ‘observation model’ then they can be used for more
than just localisation; the same models, when combined with
additional inference steps, can also be used for model selection,
decision making and motor planning and to construct sensory
imagery.
Other statistical treatments of hippocampal function address the
issue of context learning [21]. Here, a context is defined in
statistical terms as a stationary distribution of experiences. The
problem of context learning is then reduced to one of clustering
together an agent’s experiences into a finite number of contexts.
This is addressed through the use of Hidden Markov Models
(HMMs) and it is shown how this perspective explains experi-
mental findings in rat navigation concerning sequence and reversal
learning and place-cell remapping. Johnson et al. [22] provide a
normative statistical model of exploratory behaviour called
Information Foraging (IF). ‘Passive IF’ describes the temporal
distribution of an agent’s sampling process (eg. spending longer
investigating novel versus familiar objects) whereas ‘Directed IF’
describes its spatial distribution (eg. where it should move to next).
Additionally, IF is conceived to apply both to the environment and
the agent’s memory of the environment. Directed IF proposes a
common hippocampal substrate for constructive memory (eg.
scene construction), vicarious trial and error behaviour, model-
based facilitation of memory performance, and memory consol-
idation. The IF framework samples spatial locations, or episodic
memories using an information theoretic criterion. To compute
this criterion it is necessary for the agent to possess an observation
model of the sort described in our article below. A further
statistical treatment of hippocampal function comprises a two-
stage processing model of memory formation in the entorhinal-
hippocampal loop [23]. The first stage, which is proposed to take
place during theta activity, allows hippocampus to temporally
decorrelate and sparsify its input, and develop representations
based on an Independent Component Analysis. The second stage,
which is proposed to take place during Sharp Wave Ripples [24],
allows hippocampus to replay these new representations to
neocortex where long term memories are held to be instantiated.
This paper is concerned with computational processes under-
lying spatial cognition and we describe how the underlying
computations may be instantiated in hippocampus and associated
brain regions. The hippocampal formation is, however, implicated
in a much broader array of functions [25], such as episodic
memory, that our model does not address. Indeed one of the key
differences between our approach and some other models of
spatial cognition [10,16] is that the approach we describe has no
episodic component. Specifically, the sequences that are generated
in our model are the result of online computation rather than
memory recall. However, as we highlight in the discussion, the
interactions between episodic memory and the computations we
describe would be especially interesting to examine in future work.
The paper is structured as follows. The computer simulations in
this paper describe an agent acting in a simple two-dimensional
environment. This environment produces visual, somatosensory
and olfactory cues as described in the methods section on the
‘Environmental Model’. The agent then develops its own model of
the environment as described in the ‘Probabilistic Model’ section.
This describes the two elements of the model (i) a dynamical model
describing the evolution of hidden states and (ii) a mapping from
hidden states to sensory states. The section on ‘Spatial Cognition
as Statistical Inference’ then describes how the various tasks of
localisation, decision making (and sensory imagery), model
selection and motor planning can be described in probabilistic
terms. The section on ‘Forward and Backward Inference’
describes the common set of forward and backward recursions
for estimating the required probability densities. The section on
‘Results’ describes an implementation of the above algorithms and
provides some numerical results. The discussion section on
Author Summary
The ability of mammals to navigate is well studied, both
behaviourally and in terms on the underlying neurophys-
iology. Navigation is a well studied topic in computational
fields such as machine learning and signal processing.
However, studies in computational neuroscience, which
draw together these findings, have mainly focused on
specific navigation tasks such as spatial localisation. In this
paper, we propose a single probabilistic model which can
support multiple tasks, from working out which environ-
ment you are in, to computing a sequence of motor
commands that will take you to a sensory goal, such as
being warm or viewing a particular object. We describe
how these tasks can be implemented using a common set
of lower level algorithms that implement ‘forward and
backward inference over time’. We relate these algorithms
to recent findings in animal electrophysiology, where
sequences of hippocampal cell activations are observed
before, during or after a navigation task, and these
sequences are played either forwards or backwards.
Additionally, one function of the hippocampus that is
preserved across mammals is that it integrates spatial and
non-spatial information, and we propose how the forward
and backward inference algorithms naturally map onto
this architecture.
Forward and Backward Inference in Navigation
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‘Neuronal Implementation’ then describes our proposal for how
these algorithms are implemented in the brain and how functional
connectivity among a candidate set of brain regions changes as a
function of task. We conclude with a discussion of how the above
computations might relate to pattern replay and what are the
specific predictions of our model.
Methods
In what follows matrices are written in upper case bold type and
vectors in lower case bold. Scalars are written in upper or lower
case plain type. We use N(x;m,C) to denote a multivariate
Gaussian density over the random variable x having mean m and
covariance C . Table 1 provides a list of all the symbols used in the
main text.
Environmental Model
Computer simulations are implemented in Matlab (R2012a,
The MathWorks, Inc.) and are based on an agent navigating in a
simple 2D environment depicted in Figure 1. The location of the
agent is specified using orthogonal allocentric coordinates
l~½l1,l2T and its direction of heading (clockwise from positive
l2) is w. The environment contains two inner walls and four
boundary walls. The agent is equipped with a touch sensor that
detects the minimum Euclidian distance to a wall, yt. It is also
equipped with a nose that detects olfactory input, yo. In this paper
we consider a single olfactory source located at allocentric
coordinates o s~½o1,o2T . We assume this source diffuses
isotropically with scale parameter ss so that olfactory input at
location l is given by an exponential function
yo~Ao exp {
DD l{ o sDD2
2s2s
 
ð1Þ
All of the simulations use a single olfactory source with Ao~10,
o s~½7,7T and ss~5. More realistic environments with multiple
olfactory sources and turbulence [26] are beyond the scope of this
paper.
The agent is also equipped with a retina that is aligned with the
direction of heading. The retina provides one-dimensional visual
input, y v, from 245 to +45 degrees of visual angle around w and
comprises J~20 pixels. The retina provides information about the
‘colour’ of the walls within its field of view. In our simulations
‘colour’ is a scalar variable which we have displayed using
colormaps for ease of visualisation. The scalar values correspond-
ing to the various walls are 0.14 (north border), 0.29 (east border),
0.43 (south border), 0.57 (west border), 0.71 (west wall), 0.86 (east
wall). These map onto the colours shown in Figure 1 using
Matlab’s default colour map. Although classical laboratory
Table 1. Description of mathematical symbols used in the
main text.
Environmental Model
Ao Scaling of olfactory source
os Allocentric location of olfactory source
ss Spatial diffusion of olfactory source
~Y n Sequence of sensory states from
environmental model
Sensory State Variables
yo,yt, y v Olfactory, somatosensory and visual
states
yn Sensory state (comprising y
o,yt, y v)
Y n Sequence of sensory states up to time n
(observations or goals)
e n Sensory noise
Ro Variance of olfactory noise
Rt Variance of somatosensory noise
R v Covariance of visual noise
R Sensory noise covariance
(blkdiag(Ro,Rt, R v))
Control Variables
un Control signal (virtual input or motor
efference copy)
U n Sequence of control signals up to time
index n
u^n Estimate of control signal from
backward inference
B n Uncertainty in est. of control signal from
backward inference
Hidden State Variables
l Allocentric location comprising l1 and l2
s Speed
w Direction of heading
x n Hidden state (comprising l ,s,w) at time
step n
X n Hidden state sequence up to time index
n
F n Flow term describing change of state
wrt. previous state
H n Flow term describing change of state
wrt. input
z n Hidden state noise
Q Hidden state noise covariance
m n State estimate from path integration
(forward inference)
m^ n State estimate based on Bayes rule
(forward inference)
m n State estimate from backward inference
Q n Covariance of state estimate from path
integration
P n Covariance of state estimate from Bayes
rule (forward inference)
P^ n Covariance of state estimate from
backward inference
Agent’s Observation Model
Ei Model of environment i
go , gt , g v Agent’s predictions of olfactory,
somatosensory and visual state
g () Agent’s predictions of sensory state
G n Local linearisation of observation model
k Precision of head direction cells
hj Output of jth head direction cell
pi Output of ith spatial basis function
wo , wt , w v Weights in agent’s olfactory,
somatosensory and visual models
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003383.t001
Table 1. Cont.
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navigation tasks do not involve walls with different colours, they
employ extra-maze cues which enable experimental subjects to
localize themselves. For the sake of simplicity, here we provide such
visual information to the simulated agent by variation of wall colour.
The environmental model of retinal input takes the values of l
and w and produces y v using calculations based on the two-
dimensional geometrical relation of the agent with the environ-
ment. This uses a simple ray-tracing algorithm. The agent then
has its own predictive model of retinal input, described in the
‘vision’ section below, which predicts y v from l and w using a
basis set expansion. The agent has similar models of olfactory and
somatosensory input (see ‘Olfaction’ and ‘Touch’ below). Overall,
the environmental model produces the signals y v, yt and yo which
form the sensory inputs to the agent’s spatial cognition model (see
next section). We write this as ~y~½yo,yt, y vT to denote sensory
signals from the environment. For a sequence of signals we
write ~Y n~f y1, y2,::: yng. These sensory inputs are surrogates
for the compact codes produced by predictive coding in sensory
cortices [27]. We emphasise that the agent has its own model of
sensory input (an ‘observation model’) which is distinct from the
environmental input itself. The agent’s observation model is learnt
from exposure to the environment.
Probabilistic Model
We investigate agents having a model comprising two parts (i) a
dynamical model and (ii) an observation model. The dynamical
model describes how the agent’s internal state, xn is updated from
the previous time step xn{1 and motor efference copy un{1. The
observation model is a mapping from hidden states xn to sensory
states yn. Our probabilistic model falls into the general class of
discrete-time nonlinear state-space models
xn~f (xn{1, un{1)zzn
yn~g (xn)zen
ð2Þ
where un is a control input, zn is state noise and en is sensory
noise. The noise components are Gaussian distributed with
zn*N(zn; 0, Q ) and en*N(en; 0, R ). This is a Nonlinear
Dynamical System (NDS) with inputs and hidden variables. We
consider a series of time points t(1),:::,t(n),:::t(N) and denote
sequences of sensory states, hidden states, and controls using
Yn~fy1, y2,::: yng, Xn~fx1, x2,::: x ng, and U n~
fu1, u2,::: ung. These are also referred to as trajectories. The
above equations implicitly specify the state transition probability
density p(xnDxn{1, un{1) and the observation probability density
p(ynDxn,E). This latter probability depends on the agent’s model
of its environment, E. Together these densities comprise the
agent’s generative model, as depicted in Figure 2 (top left).
Path integration. During spatial localisation, an agent’s
current location can be computed using path integration. This
takes the previous location, direction of heading, velocity and
elapsed time and uses them to compute current position, by
integrating the associated differential equation. We assume that
the agent is in receipt of a control signal u which delivers
instructions to change direction, w, and speed, s. During
navigation, for example, these signals will correspond to motor
efference copy. Later we will show how these control signals can be
inferred by conditioning on desirable future events (i.e. how the
agent performs planning). For the moment we assume the controls
are known. The dynamical model is
dl1
dt
~s sin w
dl2
dt
~s cos w
ds
dt
~u1{ks
dw
dt
~u2
ð3Þ
Here the state variables are two orthogonal axes of allocentric
location, l~½l1,l2T , speed s and direction w (clockwise angle
relative to the positive l2 axis). Motion is also subject to frictional
forces as defined by the constant k. We set k~5. We can write a
Figure 1. Model of environment. Allocentric representation (left panel) and egocentric view (right panel). The agent (white triangle) is at
allocentric location l1~l2~12 and oriented at w~0 degrees (clockwise relative to the positive l2 axis). The environment contains two inner walls and
four boundary walls. The agent is equipped with whiskers that detect the minimum Euclidian distance to a wall, yt. It is also equipped with a nose
that detects the signal from an olfactory source placed at l1~7, l2~7 in the south-west corner of the maze (white circle). The agent also has a retina
that is fixed in orientation and always aligned with the direction of heading, w. The retina provides one-dimensional visual input, y v (displayed as a
one-dimensional image in the right panel), from 245 to +45 degrees of visual angle around w and comprising J~20 pixels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003383.g001
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state vector x~½l1,l2,s,wT . The control signals u1 and u2 change
the agent’s speed and direction. We can write
dx
dt
~f(x,u) ð4Þ
which can be integrated to form a discrete-time representation
xn~Fnxn{1z H nun{1 ð5Þ
using local linearisation as described in Text S1. If the
deterministic component of the dynamics is originally described
using differential equations, the flow terms F n and H n can be
computed as shown in Text S1. Here F n describes how the
current hidden state depends on the previous hidden state, and
H n how it depends on the previous input. An example of using the
above equations for implementing path integration is described in
the ‘Sensory Imagery’ simulation section below. Errors in path
integration, perhaps due to inaccuracies in the representation of
time or in local linearisation, can also be included, i.e.
xn~ Fnxn{1zHn un{1zzn ð6Þ
where zn is a random variable. This corresponds to a locally
linearised version of equation 2. For the results in this paper we
used a local regression method, due to Schaal et al. [28], to
compute F n and H n as this resulted in more robust estimates.
This is described in TextS1.
Multisensory input. We consider agents with sensory states,
yn~½yon,ytn, y vnT having olfactory, somatosensory and visual
components. Sensory states will typically be low-dimensional codes
that index richer multimodal representations in sensory cortices.
During navigation and model selection these will correspond to
inputs from the environmental model, ~yn. During decision
making and motor planning these will correspond to internally
generated sensory goals. The agent associates hidden states with
sensory states using the mapping g(xn), a nonlinear function of the
state variables. We have
yn~ g (xn)z en ð7Þ
where en is zero-mean Gaussian noise with covariance R .
During localisation and model selection g(xn) corresponds to the
agent’s prediction of its sensory input, and R specifies the
covariance of the prediction errors. These predictions can be split
Figure 2. Generative model for spatial cognition. The agent’s dynamical model is embodied in the red arrows, p(xN Dxn{1, un{1), and its
observation model in the blue arrows, p(yN DxN ,E). All of the agent’s spatial computations are based on statistical inference in this same probabilistic
generative model. The computations are defined by what variables are known (gray shading) and what the agent wishes to estimate. Sensory
Imagery Given a known initial state, x1 , and virtual motor commands UN~fu1,:: uNg, the agent can generate sensory imagery YN~fy1,::, yNg.
Decision Making Given initial state x1 , a sequence of putative motor commands UN (eg. left turn), and sensory goals YN , an agent can compute
the likelihood of attaining those goals given UN and x1 , p(YN DUN , x1,E). This computation requires a single sweep of forward inference. The agent
can then repeat this for a second putative motor sequence (eg. right turn), and decide which turn to take based on the likelihood ratio. Model
Selection Here, the agent has made observations YN and computes the likelihood ratio under two different models of the environment. Planning
can be formulated as estimation of a density over actions p(UN Dx1, YN ,E) given current state x1 and desired sensory states, YN . This requires a
forward sweep to compute the hidden states that are commensurate with the goals, and a backward sweep to compute the motor commands that
will produce the required hidden state trajectory.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003383.g002
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into modality-specific components g (xn)~½gon, gtn, g vn with asso-
ciated prediction errors having (co-)variances Ro, Rt and R v.
Equation 7 defines the likelihood
p(ynDxn,E)~N(yn; g (xn), R ) ð8Þ
We assume the different modalities are independent given the state
so that
p(ynDxn,E)~p(yonDxn,E)p(y
t
nD x n,E)p(y
v
nDxn,E) ð9Þ
where
p(yonDxn,E)~N(y
o
n; g
o,Ro)
p(ytnDxn,E)~N(y
t
n; g
t,Rt)
p( y vnDxn,E)~N(y
v
n; g
v, R v)
ð10Þ
so that R~blkdiag(R0,Rt, R v). We now describe the agent’s
model for generating the predictions go, gt and g v. Olfactory
input is predicted using a basis set
go(xn)~w
o(1)z
XNo
i~2
wo(i)pi( l n) ð11Þ
where No is the number of basis functions, l n is the location, and
wo are parameters of the olfactory model. Here we use a local
basis function representation where
pi( l )~exp {
DD l{ m i DD2
2s2
 
is the response of the ith basis cell. Following Foster et al. [29]
pi( l ) may be viewed as an idealised place cell output, where m i is
the spatial location of the centre of cell i’s place field, and s its
breadth. We assume that the parameters governing the location
and width of these cells have been set in a previous learning phase.
In this paper we used s~2:4 and the centres of the place fields m i
were arranged to form a 10-by-10 grid in allocentric space. The
same set of cells were used as a basis for predicting olfactory,
somatosensory and visual input.
The parameters w o will have to be learnt for each new
environment. For the results in this paper they are learnt using a
regression approach, which assumes knowledge of the agent’s
location. More generally, they will have to be learnt without such
knowledge and on a slower time scale than (or after learning of) the
place cell centres and widths. This is perfectly feasible but beyond
the scope of the current paper. We return to this issue in the
discussion.
In the agent’s model, somatosensory input is predicted using a
basis set
gt(x n)~w
t(1)z
XNt
i~2
wt(i)pi( l n) ð12Þ
where w t are the parameters of the somatosensory model. Here
we envisage that processing in somatosensory cortex is sufficiently
sophisticated to deliver a signal yt that is the minimum distance to
a physical boundary. If the agent had whiskers, a simple function
of yt would correspond to the amount of whisker-related neural
activity. More sophisticated generative models of somatosensory
input would have a directional, and perhaps a dynamic
component. But this is beyond the scope of the current paper.
The agent’s retina is aligned with the direction of heading, w.
The retina provides one-dimensional visual input, y v, from 245
to +45 degrees of visual angle around w and comprising J~20
pixels. An example of retinal input is shown in the right panel of
Figure 1. The agent’s prediction of this visual input is provided by
a weighted conjunction of inputs from populations of place/grid
and head direction cells. The head direction cells are defined as
hj(w)~exp(k cos(w{wj)) ð13Þ
where wj is the preferred angle of the jth basis function and k
defines the range of angles to which it is sensitive. The output for
retinal angle wr is given simply by hj(wzwr). Visual input at retinal
angle wr is then predicted to be
gvr (xn)~
X
ij
wvijpi( l n)hj(wnzwr) ð14Þ
This sort of conjunctive representation is widely used to provide
transformations among coordinate systems and, for sensorimotor
transforms, is thought to be supported by parietal cortex [30]. The
above mapping is adaptable and can be optimised by choosing
appropriate weights w v and these will have to be learnt for each
new environment.
It is a gross simplification to predict retinal input, or egocentric
views, with a single stage of computation as in the above equation.
More realistic models of this process [31,32] propose separate
representations of the spatial and textural components of
landmarks, with bilateral connectivity to cells in a parietal network
which effect a transform between allocentric and egocentric
coordinates. Egocentric view cells are then also connected to this
parietal network. This level of detail is omitted from our current
model, as our aim is to focus on temporal dynamics.
Overall, the agent’s model of multisensory input has parameters
w~½wo, w t, w vT . For each new environment, E, the agent has a
separate set of parameters. Experiments on rats have found that
changes to the environment cause changes in the pattern of firing
of place cells [33,34]. This could happen in our model if the cells
fire at rates go(xn), g
t(xn) and g
v(xn) and the parameters w are
updated to reflect changes in sensory features. In the simulations
that follow the w parameters are set using a separate learning
phase prior to spatial cognition. More detailed models of this
learning process propose that cells in the dentate gyrus select
which CA3 cells will be engaged for encoding a new environment
[35]. Connections from EC to selected CA3 cells are then updated
to learn the relevant place-landmark associations.
Spatial Cognition as Statistical Inference
This section describes, initially at the level of manipulations of
probability densities, how the various computations underlying
spatial cognition can be implemented. It then describes a practical
algorithm based on local linearisation. If an agent has a
probabilistic model of its environment, E, then the various tasks
that together comprise spatial cognition are optimally implement-
ed using statistical inference in that model. These inferences will be
optimal in the sense of maximising likelihood. The various tasks -
localisation, imagery, decision making, model selection and
planning - all rely on the same statistical model. They are
differentiated by what variables are known and what the agent
wishes to compute. This is depicted in the panels in Figure 2 where
shaded circles denote known quantities. Additionally, for each
Forward and Backward Inference in Navigation
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task, the information entering the system may be of a different
nature. For example, for imagery, the inputs, U n, are virtual
motor commands and for localisation they are motor efference
copies. Similarly, during localisation and model selection the agent
receives inputs from sensory cortices. For the simulations in this
paper these come from the environmental model, ~Y n. However,
during decision making and motor planning these inputs do not
derive from the agent’s environment but are generated internally
and correspond to the agent’s goals Y n.
Localisation. The use of dynamic models with hidden states
for spatial localisation is well established in the literature [20,36,37].
Estimation of spatial location requires motor efference copy U n,
and sensory input Y N . The initial location x1 may be known or
specified with some degree of uncertainty. Forward inference over
states (in time) can then be used to optimally combine probabilistic
path integration with sensory input to estimate location. This
produces the density p(xnDU n, x1, ~Y n,E). A Gaussian approxi-
mation to this density based on a local linearisation is described
below in the section on forward inference over states (see equation
24). The agent’s best estimate of its location is then given by the
maximum likelihood estimate
x^n~ arg max
x n
p(xnDU n, x1, ~Y n,E) ð15Þ
We refer to this as a maximum likelihood estimate because there is
no distribution over xn prior to observing the sequence ~Y n. This
is commensurate with standard terminology [38]. However, one
could also think of this as a posterior estimate, due to the sequential
nature of the estimation process (see below), in that there is a
distribution over xn prior to the observation at a single time point
~yn. For the Gaussian approximation to this density, we have
x^n~ mn where mn is the mean of the Gaussian.
It is also possible to improve the above estimates retrospectively
x^n~ arg max
x n
p(xnDU N , x1, Y^ N ,E) ð16Þ
where nvN . For example, upon leaving an underground metro
system and turning left you may not know that you are heading
north until you encounter a familiar landmark. You can then use
this observation to update your estimate about where you have
been previously. Estimation of p(xnDU N , x1, ~Y N ,E) requires
forward and backward inference over hidden states (see equation
30). The Gaussian approximation to this density has mean m^n, so
that under the local linear approximation we have x^n~ m^n.
Decision making. Given initial state x1, a sequence of
putative motor commands U 1N (eg. left turn), and sensory goals
Y N , an agent can compute the likelihood of attaining those goals,
p(Y N DU 1N , x1,E). This computation requires a single sweep (or
‘replay’ - see discussion) of forward inference (see equation 29 in
the section on ‘Likelihood’ below). The agent can then repeat this
for a second putative motor sequence (eg. right turn), U 2N , and
decide which turn to take based on the likelihood ratio.
LR(U 1N , U
2
N )~
p(Y N DU 1N , x1,E)
p(Y N DU 2N , x1,E)
ð17Þ
Here Y N are internally generated task goals rather than sensory
input from the environment ~Y N . Decisions based on the
likelihood ratio are statistically optimal [38]. In probabilistic
models of sequential data the likelihood can be computed by a
single forward pass of inference, as described below. We would
therefore need two forward passes to compute the LR, one for
each putative motor sequence.
This formulation of decision making is based on sets of motor
primitives being combined to form actions such as ‘turn left’ or
‘turn right’. This can therefore also be regarded as motor planning
(see below) at some higher level. Additionally, the generation of
sensory imagery can be viewed as a component of decision making
because, to evaluate the likelihood, sensory goals must be
compared with sensory predictions from the agent’s generative
model. In later sections we consider sensory imagery in its own
right.
Model selection. Given motor efference copy U N , and
sensory input ~Y N the agent computes the likelihood ratio under
two different models of the environment. The agent’s best estimate
of which environment it is in, is given by the maximum likelihood
estimate
E^~ arg max
Ei
p( ~Y N DUN , x1,Ei) ð18Þ
For consistency with terminology in statistics, we refer to this as
model selection. This can be implemented using multiple sweeps
of forward inference, one for each potential environment. The
likelihood can be computed, for example, for two maze models E1
and E2 each hypothesising that the agent is in a particular
environment. To decide which environment the observations are
drawn from one can compute the likelihood ratio
LR(E1,E2)~
p(~Y N DUN , x1,E1)
p(~Y N DUN , x1,E2)
ð19Þ
where each probability is computed using equation 29 in the
section on ‘Likelihood’ below.
Motor planning. Given current state x 1 and sensory goals,
Y N , planning can be formulated as estimation of a density over
actions p(U nDx1,Y N ,E), as depicted in Figure 2. This requires a
forward sweep to compute the hidden states that are commensu-
rate with the goals, and a backward sweep to compute the motor
commands that will produce the required hidden state trajectory.
This is described in the section below on ‘Inference over Inputs’
and can be implemented using equations 33 and 34. The agent’s
best estimate of the motor commands needed to attain sensory
goals Y N is given by the maximum likelihood estimate
U^ n~ arg max
U n
p(U nDx1,Y N ,E) ð20Þ
Here Y N are internally generated task goals rather than sensory
input from the environment ~Y N .
Forward and Backward Inference
Text S2 describes how the required probability densities can be
computed at the very general level of manipulations of probability
densities. However, these operations cannot be implemented
exactly. They can only be implemented approximately and there
are basically two types of approximate inference methods. These
are based either on sampling [39] or Local Linearization (LL) [40].
In this paper we adopt an LL approach although this is not
without disadvantages. We return to this important issue in the
discussion. The following subsections describe the forward and
backward inference algorithms under LL assumptions. Readers
unfamiliar with statistical inference for dynamical systems models
may benefit from textbook material [38].
Forward and Backward Inference in Navigation
PLOS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 7 December 2013 | Volume 9 | Issue 12 | e1003383
Forward inference over hidden states. The problem of
estimating the hidden states given current and previous sensory
states is solved using Forward Inference. This produces the
marginal densities p(xnDU n,x1,Yn). Estimation of the state xn is
based only on information up to that time point. For Linear
Dynamical Systems (LDS), forward inference corresponds to the
Kalman Filter, and for nonlinear dynamical systems under LL,
forward inference can be instantiated using an Extended Kalman
Filter (EKF) [40]. After local linearisation the state-space model
can be written as
xn~ F nxn{1z H n un{1z zn
yn~ G nxnz en
ð21Þ
where F n, H n and G n are Jacobian matrices (see TextS1 and
below). There is a long history of applying KFs, EKFs and related
state-space models to the problem of localisation [20,36]. Indeed
one of the key implementations of the KF is for solving the
localisation problem. These probabilistic algorithms have been
used in a formalism known as Simultaneous Localisation and
Mapping (SLAM) [37]. The goal of SLAM research is to develop
an algorithm that would allow an agent to explore and map novel
environments.
In the context of localisation, forward inference allows
information from path integration and sensory input to be
combined in an optimal way. Under a local linear approximation
the state estimates are Gaussian
p(xnDU n,x 1,Y n,E)~N(x n; mn,P n) ð22Þ
and these quantities can be estimated recursively using an EKF.
Here mn is the agent’s estimate of x n based only on information
up to time index n. The covariance P n quantifies the agent’s
uncertainty about x n, again based on information up to that time
point. The agent’s best estimate of location, based on forward
inference, is then given by the first two entries in mn (the third and
fourth entries are speed and direction, see equation 3). The EKF
equations can be expressed in two steps. The first is a prediction step
p(x nDU n,x 1,Y n{1,E)~N(xn; m n,Q n)
mn~F nmn{1z H n un{1
Q n~ F nP n{1F
T
nz Q
ð23Þ
where Q is the state noise covariance defined earlier. During
localisation this corresponds to probabilistic path integration. The
second is a correction step
p(x nDU n,x 1,Y n,E)~N(x n; mn,P n)
mn~ mnz K n(yn{ g (mn))
P n~(I{K nG n)Q n
ð24Þ
where the ‘Kalman Gain’ is
K n~ Q nG
T
n (G nQ nG
T
nz R)
{1 ð25Þ
and the i, jth entry in G n is given by
Gn(i, j)~
dg(x )i
dxj
ð26Þ
evaluated at x~ mn. The correction step provides optimal
combination of probabilistic path integration with sensory input.
More specifically, probabilistic path integration produces an
estimate of the current state mn. The agent produces a prediction
of sensory input g (mn) and compares it with actual sensory input
yn. The final estimate of the current state is then m n plus the
Kalman gain times the prediction error yn{ g (mn). This very
naturally follows predictive coding principles, as described below in
the section on Neuronal Implementation. Together, the above
updates implement an EKF and these recursions are initialised by
specifying the initial distribution over hidden states.
p( x 1DE)~N(x1; m1, P 1) ð27Þ
Likelihood. As described in Text S2, we can use the
predictive densities to compute the likelihood of a data sequence.
Under local linearisation the predictive density is given by
p(ynDU n, x1, Y n{1,E)~N(yn; g (mn), Sn)
Sn~G nQ nG
T
nz R
ð28Þ
The log-likelihood of a sequence of observations is then
log p(Y N DU N , x1,E)~
XN
n~1
log p(ynDU n, x1, Y n{1,E)
~{
1
2
XN
n~1
eTn S
{1
n en{
1
2
XN
n~1
log D SnD
ð29Þ
where en~ yn{ g ( mn) is the prediction error. The (log)
likelihood of sensory input Y N can thus be computed using
equation 29. The first term in this equation corresponds to an
accumulation of sum-squared prediction errors weighted by the
inverse variance (precision). During decision making, the likeli-
hood of attaining sensory goals Y N under a proposed control
sequence U N is computed using this method. During model
selection, the likelihood of sensory observations ~Y N , under a
proposed model of the environment, E, is also computed using this
method.
Backward inference over hidden states. Forward infer-
ence over the states is used to estimate a distribution over x n
using all observations up to time point t(n). Backward inference
over the states can then be used to improve these estimates by
using observations up to time point t(N) i.e. future observations.
The resulting estimates are therefore retrospective. An example of
when this retrospective updating is beneficial is when the
observation of a new landmark disambiguates where you have
previously been located. For locally linear systems, Backward
Inference over states is implemented using
p(xnDU N ,x1,Y N ,E)~N(xn; m^n, P^ n)
m^n~ mnz J n(m^nz1{ m nz1)
P^ n~ P nz J n(P^ nz1{ Q nz1) J
T
n
J n~ P nF
T
n Q
{1
nz1
ð30Þ
Here, m^n is the optimal state estimate given all sensory data up to
time N. Intuitively, the state estimate based on data up to time n,
mn, is improved upon based on state estimates at future time
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points (mn for n~nz1,::,N). The resulting sequence m^n will
provide more accurate state estimates than those based on purely
forward inference, mn.
The above formulae are known as the ‘gamma recursions’
(see Text S2). An alternative algorithm for computing
p(xnDU N , x1, Y N ,E), based on the ‘beta recursions’, requires
storage of the data sequence Y N and so is not an online
algorithm. The gamma recursions may therefore have a simpler
neuronal implementation (see below).
The above recursions depend on a number of quantities from
forward inference. These are mn, mn, Q n and P n. The gamma
recursions are initialised with m^N~ mN and P^N~ PN . For an
LDS the above equations constitute the well-known Rauch-Tung-
Striebel (RTS) smoother. Various reparameterisations can be
made to remove computation of matrix inverses [41]. A predictive
coding interpretation is readily applied to the second row of the
above equation. The backward estimate m^n is equal to the
forward estimate mn plus a correction term which is given by a
learning rate matrix J n times a prediction error. This prediction
error is the difference between the estimate of the next state based
on the entire data sequence, m^nz1, minus the prediction of the
next state based only on data up to the current time point, mnz1.
Inference over inputs. This section describes forward and
backward inference over hidden states and inputs. If the controls
are unknown we can estimate them by computing
p(mnD x 1,Y N ,E) where x1 is the current state and Y N are the
desired sensory states. This probability can be computed via
forward and backward inference in the following locally linearised
model
xn~ Fnxn{1z H n un{1z zn
yn~ Gnx nz en
ð31Þ
with zn*N(zn; 0, Q x), un*N(un; 0, Q u) and en*N
(en; 0, R ). The initial control values are distributed as
p(u1DE)~N(u1; r1, B 1) ð32Þ
Informally, the forward sweep is necessary to compute the hidden
states that are commensurate with sensory goals, and the
backward sweep for computing the inputs that will produce the
required state trajectory. Text S3 shows how inferences about the
unknown controls can be made by creating an augmented state-
space model and using the previously described equations for
forward and backward inference over the states. The density over
estimated inputs is a Gaussian
p(unD x1,Y N ,E)~N(un; u^n, B^ n) ð33Þ
with mean u^n and covariance B^ n. In the absence of correlations
between inputs and hidden states the backward inference formulae
have the simplified form
u^n~ Ln(m^nz1{ m nz1)
Ln~ B nH
TQ{1nz1
B^ n~ B nz Ln( P^ nz1{Q nz1)L
T
n
ð34Þ
Effectively, the optimal inputs are estimated using a model-
based deconvolution of the desired sensory states.
Results
This section describes computer simulations showing how the
agent’s model can be used to generate visual imagery, and how
inference in that model can implement decision making, model
selection and motor planning. Here, ‘model selection’ refers to
estimating which model of the environment is most likely given
sensory data. An agent would use this to figure out what maze it
was in.
In what follows we assume the agent is already equipped with
the correct dynamical model p(xnDxn{1, un{1). The first section
below describes a preliminary learning phase in which the sensory
mapping p(ynDxn,E) is learnt for a given environment E. Once
the agent has a dynamical and a sensory mapping it is in effect
equipped with a model of its environment which can be thought of
as its own virtual reality system. It can then predict the sensory
consequences of the control signals it receives.
The degree to which each sensorymodality is used in the following
simulations is determined by the relative values of observation noise
covariance (see TextS4 for details). Here we set Ro~0:125, Rt~0:1
and R v~100I (see equation 10). This means that the agent is
guided most by olfaction and touch, and least by vision. Note,
however, that as there are many more visual than somatosensory or
olfactory inputs this differential weighting is perhaps less distinct than
it might first appear. All the simulations use N~1000 time points
with a time step of dt~0:01. The simulations also used a very low
level of dynamical noise, Q~10{12 I , except for the planning
example where we used Q~10{6 I .
Sensory Imagery
This section describes a preliminary learning phase in which an
agent is exposed to an environment to learn the sensory mapping
from states xn to observations yn. Here the agent is provided
with the observations yn and also exact knowledge of the hidden
states xn. More realistic simulations would also require the agent
to infer the hidden states xn whilst learning. This is in principle
straightforward but is beyond the scope of the current paper, as
our focus is on temporal dynamics. We return to this point in the
discussion.
The olfactory and sensorimotor models use a 10-by-10 grid of
basis cells giving 100 cells in all. We assume that the parameters
governing the location and width of these cells have been set in a
previous learning phase. The weight vectors wo and w t (see
equations 11 and 12) were optimised using least squares regression
and 225 training exemplars with uniform spatial sampling. The
retinal model used the same number and location of basis cells. It
additionally used 32 head direction cells each having a directional
precision parameter k~3. The conjunctive representation com-
prised 3200 basis cells. The weight vector w v (see equation 14)
was optimised using least squares and a training set comprising
10,575 exemplars. These were generated from spatial positions
taken uniformly throughout the maze. Visual input from the
environmental model for multiple directions at each spatial
location was used to create the training examples. At the end of
this learning phase the agent is exquisitely familiar with the
environment.
A trained model can then be used to generate visual imagery.
This is implemented by specifying a synthetic control sequence,
running path integration and generating predictions from the
model. For example, Figure 3A shows a control sequence that is
used to generate the ‘north-east’ trajectory shown in Figure 3C.
We also generated ‘north-west’, ‘south-west’ and ‘south-east’
trajectories by changing the sign of direction change, u2, and/or
the initial direction, w1.
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To quantitatively assess the accuracy of these imagery
sequences, f g 1, g 2,:::, gNg, we compared them to the sequence
of visual inputs that would have been received from the
environmental model, f ~y1, ~y2,:::, ~yNg. Figure 3D plots the
proportion of variance explained by the agent’s model as a
function of retinal angle. These plots were computed separately for
each trajectory, and show that only activity in the central retina is
accurately predicted. This is due to the increased optic flow in
peripheral regions of the agent’s retina. The asymmetry in
Figure 3D is due to the particular spatial arrangement and
numerical values of the visual cues. These results suggest that it
would be better to have a retina with lower spatial resolution in the
periphery.
Localisation
This simulation shows how an agent can localise itself in an
environment. The agent was located centrally and moved
according to the south-east trajectory. Its exact path was computed
using noiseless path integration and the appropriate environmental
inputs were provided to the agent.
In the discussion section below we propose a mapping of the
forward and backward inference equations onto the hippocampal-
entorhinal complex. We now report the results of two simulations.
The first used the standard forward inference updates in equations
23 and 24. This corresponds to the algorithm that an agent with
an intact hippocampus would use. The second, however, had a
‘lesioned hippocampus’ in that only the path integral updates in
equation 23 were used (we set mn~mn). This in effect removed the
top down input from hippocampus to MEC (see ‘Localisation’
subsection in the discussion) so that path integral errors are not
corrected by sensory input. In both cases the agent’s path updates,
mn, were subject to a small amount of noise (with standard
deviation 0.01) at each time step.
Figure 4 shows the results for single and multiple trials. Here,
localisation with an intact hippocampus results in better tracking of the
agent’s location. Localisation accuracy was assessed over multiple
trials (n~10) and found to be significantly more accurate with, rather
than without, a hippocampus (pv0:001, t~7:15, df~9). The mean
localisation error was 60 per cent smaller with a hippocampus.
For the above simulations we disabled somatosensory input by
setting Rt~100. This was found to be necessary as this input is not
a reliable predictor of location (the distance from a boundary is the
same at very many locations in an environment).
Decision Making
This simulation shows how an agent can make a decision about
which direction to turn by computing likelihood ratios. To
demonstrate this principle, we selected the ‘north-west’ and ‘north-
east’ trajectories as two possible control sequences. The sensory
goal Y N was set equal to the sensory input that would be received
at the end of the ‘north-east’ trajectory. This goal was set to be
identical at all time points n~1::N .
The agent’s starting location was l1~13 and l2~12 with initial
speed set to zero. The log of the likelihood ratio (see equation 28),
LogLR, for model 1 versus model 2 was then computed at each
time step. Figure 5 shows the accumulated LogLR as a function of
the n~1 to 1000 time points along the trajectory. A LogLR of 3
corresponds to a probability of 95% [42]. This indicates that a
Figure 3. Visual imagery. (A) Control sequence used to generate visual imagery for the ‘north-east’ trajectory. The input signals are acceleration,
u1 , and change in direction, u2 . These control signals change the agent’s state according to equation 3. (B) The state variables speed s and direction w
produced by the control sequence in A. (C) The state variables l1 and l2 shown as a path (red curve). This is the ‘north-east’ trajectory. The state
variable time series in B and C were produced by integrating the dynamics in equation 3 using the local linearisation approach of equation 5. (D)
Accuracy of visual imagery produced by agent as compared to sensory input that would have been produced by the environmental model. The
figure shows the proportion of variance, R2 , explained by the agent’s model as a function of retinal angle, wr . This was computed separately for the
north-east (black), north-west (red), south-east (blue) and south-west (green) trajectories. Only activity in the centre of the retina is accurately
predicted.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003383.g003
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confident decision can be made early on in the hypothesized
trajectories.
The degree to which each sensory modality is used in the above
computations is determined by the relative values of observation
noise covariances (see Text S4). These were initially fixed to the
values described at the beginning of the simulations section. Whilst
a confident decision could soon be reached using the above default
values, decomposition of the LR into modality specific terms
showed a strong contribution from both olfactory and visual
modalities, but a somatosensory contribution that was initially
rather noisy. This is due to small idiosyncrasies in the predictions
of somatosensory values. We therefore experimented with the level
of somatosensory noise covariance. Figure 5 was produced using a
value of Rt~100 which means LR effectively ignores this
contribution (although we also have R v~100I , there are 20
visual inputs).
Model Selection
This simulation shows how likelihood ratios can also be used to
estimate what environment an agent is located in. We first trained
an agent on the maze as described in the imagery section. We
refer to this as environment one and the model, described by the
set of estimated weights w , as model one. We then trained the
agent on a second environment and allowed it to develop a
separate model. These are referred to as environment two and
model two. The second environment was exactly the same as the
first except that the east and west boundary walls had their
colours swapped.
Figure 4. Localisation. Left: Representative result from a single trial showing true route computed using noiseless path integration (black curve),
localisation with a noisy path integrator and no Hippocampus (blue curve) and localisation with a noisy path integrator and a Hippocampus (red
curve). Right: Boxplots of localisation error over trials with medians indicated by red bars, box edges indicating 25th and 75th percentiles, whiskers
indicating more extreme points, and outliers plotted as red crosses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003383.g004
Figure 5. Decision making. The task of decision making is to decide whether to make a left or a right turn (hence the question mark in the above
graphic). Top Left: Locations on the route of the ‘left turn’ or north-west trajectory (red curve) Top Right: The markers A, B, C, D and E denote
locations on the ‘right turn’ or north-east trajectory corresponding to time points n~0, 200, 400, 600 and 800 respectively. Bottom: The log likelihood
ratio (of north-east versus north-west), LogLR, as a function of the number of time points along the trajectory.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003383.g005
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We then placed the agent in the first maze and used the ‘north-
east’ control trajectory, U N , and allowed the agent to compute
the likelihood of observed data under its two models, E1 and E2, as
described earlier. The log of the likelihood ratio, LogLR for model
1 versus model 2 was then computed at each time step. Figure 6
shows the LogLR as a function of the number of time points along
the trajectory.
The degree to which each sensory modality is used in the above
computations is determined by the relative values of observation
noise covariances. These were fixed to the values described at the
beginning of the simulations section. However, because the only
difference between the two models is in their predictions of retinal
input (due to the swapping of wall colours), the above computation
is driven solely by vision.
For the decision making example, described above, the
likelihood of reaching the goal given the two trajectories is also
differentiated by the olfactory inputs at the goal location (as the
olfactory source is located in the south west corner and diffuses
isotropically, there will be weaker input in the north east than
north west corner). This explains the scaling differences in the
likelihood ratios - decision making is easier, in this example, as it is
guided by olfaction as well as vision. This is not generally the case,
however, and only occurred here due to the specifics of the
environments and goals (same olfactory sources at same locations
in both mazes, different olfactory inputs at the two goals).
Route and Motor Planning
This simulation gives an example of how route and motor
planning can be implemented. The agent is placed in maze 1 at
starting location l1~20, l2~15 with initial speed s~0 and
direction w~0:9p. This initial state, m1, is known with high
precision P{11 ~10
6I (see equation 27). The initial distribution
over motor controls has mean r1~0 and precision B
{1
1 ~10
6 I
(see equation 32). The covariance of the noise on the motor
controls is set to Q u~diag½1, 0:05 (see equation 31). This
specifies that the control signals for changes in acceleration (first
element) are expected to be larger than those for direction (second
element). For this simulation we augmented the sensory vector y
with observations of the agent’s speed ys~xn(3).
The sensory goal yg~½yo,yt, y v,ysT is multimodal with
components for olfaction, touch, vision and speed. For olfaction,
touch and speed we set yo~10, yt~4 and ys~0. The goal is
therefore to navigate to the point in space with olfactory code most
similar to yo~10. The environmental location with this value is
l1~7, l2~7. The observation noise covariance for speed was set to
R s~10. A second aim is that the distance to the nearest boundary
should be close to yt~4. A third aim is that the speed should be as
near to ys~0 as possible. That is, the agent should be stationary at
the target. The visual component y v is set to correspond to an
image of the left wall with all ‘yellow’ values. The desired goal
trajectory, Y N , is set to be equal to the goal yg at all time points.
The degree to which each sensory modality is used in motor
planning is determined by the relative values of observation noise
covariance. We used the values described at the beginning of the
simulations section. This means that motor planning is guided
most by olfaction and touch, and least by vision. The estimated
hidden states and inputs were then computed as shown in the
earlier section on ‘Inference over Inputs’.
Figure 7 shows the planned route traced out by forward and
backward inference. For forward inference we are plotting the l1
and l2 elements of mn (see equation 24), and for backward
inference the l1 and l2 elements of m^n (see equation 30). The paths
Figure 6. Model selection. The task of model selection is for the agent to decide which environment it is in (hence the question mark in the above
graphic). Top Left: North-east trajectory in maze 2, Top Right: North-east trajectory in maze 1. The mazes have different coloured east and west walls.
The markers on the trajectories (A, B, C, D and E) denote locations corresponding to different time points (n~0, 200, 400, 600 and 800). Bottom: The
log likelihood ratio (of maze 1 versus maze 2), LogLR, as a function of the number of time points along the trajectory. At n= 1000, the LogLR is
approximately 3. This allows the agent to infer, with 95% probability, that it is located in maze 1 rather than maze 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003383.g006
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for backward inference are smoother and more direct. Figure 7 also
shows the estimated motor control sequence. These sequences
correspond to the mean from backward inference, u^n, as described
in the section on ‘Inference over Inputs’ (see equation 33).
Simple decisions such as ‘turn left’ or ‘turn right’ can be
implemented using the ‘decision making’ procedure described in
the above section. This is a rudimentary form of planning. The
route and motor planning described here is a more powerful
approach that we envisage is engaged when the optimal route to a
goal involves the chaining together of multiple decisions (eg. ‘turn
left’, ‘straight on’, ‘turn right’).
Discussion
This paper has illustrated how the various computations
underlying goal-directed spatial cognition can be implemented
using statistical inference in a single probabilistic model. This
extends previous work which has focussed on single computations
such as localisation [20] or model selection [21]. Here we use a
single model, and show that inference based on different
combinations of known and unknown variables can additionally
implement goal-based planning and decision making, and have
shown how a specific implementation based on a continuous state
space model and local linearisation can achieve these ends. In
what follows we describe a neuronal implementation of our
approach and discuss how the underlying forward and backward
algorithms may relate to recent empirical findings of pattern
replay. We close by describing a number of experimental
predictions suggested by the model.
Neuronal Implementation
This section discusses how and where in the brain the above
computational processes might be implemented. Our starting
point here is Figure 8 which describes a candidate set of brain
regions. Entorhinal cortex is partitioned into Lateral (LEC) and
Medial (MEC) components, with the latter representing spatial
and the former non-spatial information [43]. The LEC receives
substantial input from perirhinal cortex which in turn receives
major projections from temporal cortices, whereas the MEC
receives substantial input from parahippocampal cortex which in
turn receives projections from parietal cortices. The anatomical
connectivity supporting this architecture is described in Figure 3 of
[44]. We assume that temporal, parietal, parahippocampal and
perirhinal cortices and the machinery that feeds into them,
together produce a compact coding of spatial and non-spatial
aspects of the agent’s environment. These processes are not
explicitly modelled in this paper.
Our simple and tentative mapping onto hippocampal neuro-
anatomy currently does not distinguish between CA3 and CA1,
instead we consider a single hippocampal node encompassing the
activity of CA3-CA1 place cells. Our model then comprises two
hippocampal-entorhinal loops, one spatial and one non-spatial, as
shown in Figure 8 (top left). The spatial loop proceeds from
superficial MEC layers to CA3-CA1, and returns to deep layers of
MEC. This partitioning into deep and superficial layers is
consistent with known anatomy and previous functional models
[45]. Anatomically, entorhinal-hippocampal connectivity is more
complex with, for example, direct connections from EC layer three
to CA1 [46], and return connections via proximal CA1 (CA1p)
and distal Subiculum (SUBd) [47], but our model does not have
this level of detail.
The non-spatial loop proceeds from superficial LEC layers to
CA3-CA1, and returns to deep layers of LEC. The sensory states
of our spatial model, yn, are compact codes representing non-
spatial information in the superficial layers of LEC. Predictions of
these sensory states from the agent’s model, g (mn), are made via
the CA3-CA1 to LEC pathway. In our model, the function of
CA3-CA1 is to integrate spatial input from MEC with non-spatial
input from LEC. This is consistent with a recent schematic model
[48], where it is argued that this functionality is preserved across
mammals.
The mapping from CA3-CA1 to LEC generates the agent’s
predictions of sensory states, whereas the mapping from LEC to
CA3-CA1 implements the (approximate) inverse of this mapping.
Together, these recurrent connections constitute the agent’s model
of its environment, E, and different models will be instantiated in
different subsets of these connections. That populations of cells in
LEC encode sensory prediction errors, yn{ g (mn), is supported
by recent recordings in rats [49]. This study identified cells that
fired at locations where objects had been located on previous trials
(high prediction error), but did not respond when the object was
actually present (no prediction error).
Figure 7. Route and motor planning. Right: The figure shows the planned route traced out by forward (red) and backward (green) inference. For
forward inference we are plotting the l1 and l2 elements of mn , and for backward inference the l1 and l2 elements of m^n . The agent is located at
l1~20, l2~15 (white cross) and the goal is at l1~7, l2~7 (white circle). Left: The figure shows the estimated motor control sequence for producing
the desired sensory goals. This sequence corresponds to the mean from backward inference, u^n , as described in the theory section on ‘Inference
over Inputs’.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003383.g007
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Grid, place and direction cells. Our model assumes that
path integration takes place in the Entorhinal Cortex. A number of
computational models of the underlying processing have appeared
in the literature [45,50,51] and assume that allocentric space,
direction and velocity are represented by populations of grid cells.
These grid cells were originally discovered in rat Entorhinal
Cortex (EC) and represent space using a Fourier-like basis set [52].
More recently, an fMRI study has found evidence of grid-cell-like
representations in human EC [53].
Our model also assumes representations of space in CA3-CA1
which we envisage are supported by the activity of place cells.
These place cells fire bursts of action potentials when a rat passes
through a particular location in their environment [54]. Place cells
have also been found in humans using intracranial unit recordings
[55], and neuroimaging of human subjects has implicated the
hippocampus in navigation [56] and the representation of spatial
location [57]. A representation of spatial distance has also been
identified in left hippocampus [58]. Hidden state representations
of direction, in our model, are perhaps encoded by head direction
cells. These neurons fire in relation to an animal’s direction of
heading regardless of its current location, and have been found in
postsubiculum, retrosplenial cortex, anterior thalamus, striatum
and entorhinal cortex [59]. Additionally, directionally modulated
grid cells have been found in entorhinal cortex [60].
In summary, the speed, location and direction variables that
comprise the agent’s hidden state are most likely represented in a
highly distributed manner in the brain, using basis representations
built on cell types with multiple dependencies. In EC these will be
grid cells and in CA3-CA1 these will be place cells. This level of
detail is omitted from our model, as our focus is on temporal
dynamics.
Figures 8 and 9 refer to a ‘prefrontal’ module containing
representations of model inputs un which are changes in heading
direction and changes in speed. We envisage that this is a
distributed circuit involving both cortical and subcortical brain
regions. The subcortical regions would include for example those
parts of the head direction circuit receiving proprioceptive
feedback and motor efference copy [59].
Localisation. The architecture in Figure 8 (top left) assumes
that path integration takes place in MEC, as discussed in a recent
review [51]. MEC contains multi-scale grid cells which provide a
basis set representation of allocentric space. In our model of spatial
localisation, path integration combines previous state estimates
mn{1 and motor efference copy mn to get a new state estimate,
with mean mn~ Fnmn{1z H n un{1 as described in equation
23.
We assume that networks in CA3-CA1 implement Bayes rule
such that location estimates from path integration computed in
Figure 8. Neuronal implementation. Here n indexes time and we have control signals un , path integral hidden state estimates mn , Bayesian
state estimates, mn , non-spatial sensory states, yn and predictions of non-spatial sensory states g (mn). During Localisation, path integration in
MEC combines previous state estimates and motor efference copy to produce a new state estimate, with mean mn~ Fnmn{1z H n un{1 as
described in equation 23. Bayesian inference in CA3-CA1 combines path integration with sensory input to get an improved state estimate
mn~ mnz K n½yn{ g (mn) as described in equation 24. LEC sends a prediction error signal yn{ g (mn) to CA3-CA1. The computations underlying
‘sensory imagery’, ‘decision making’ and ‘model selection’ are discussed in the main text in the section on ‘Neural Implementation’. CA: Cornu
Ammonis, LEC/MEC: Lateral/Medial Entorhinal cortex.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003383.g008
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MEC, mn, are combined with non-spatial information to form an
improved estimate of location, mn. The new estimate is given by
mn~ mnz K n(yn{ g (mn)) and is described more fully in
equation 24. This new estimate is then fed back to MEC to be
incorporated into the next iteration of path integration.
A more detailed mapping onto neuroanatomy, which is
consistent with our proposal, can be motivated by concerns for
how grid and place cells keep in register [61]. It has been suggested
[62] that CA1 combines grid cell outputs from MEC with cue
information from CA3 place cells. In our model this would
correspond to CA3 computing Kn(yn{ g (mn)) and CA1
computing mn~ m nz Kn(yn{ g (mn)). Region CA1 would
then signal mn back to MEC, and the CA1 to LEC pathway
could compute g (mn) using a representation based on place cells
in CA1.
The above iterative updates capture the circular nature of
estimating position and direction. The activity of head direction
cells [59], for example, is known to be dependent on the
identification of landmarks, and on self-motion cues, such as
vestibular and proprioceptive cues. Here, we envisage that
vestibular cues, proprioceptive cues and self-motion contribute to
probabilistic path integration and that forward inference then
combines path integration with sensory input regarding land-
marks. The relative contribution of path integration and sensory
input, during spatial localisation, is discussed in more detail in
Text S4.
The integration of sensory cues with path integral estimates of
location has previously been considered in a model by Arleo and
Gerstner [63]. In this model, once the error in path integration has
reached a certain level the path integrator is reset using
information from sensory cues. This is to be contrasted with the
algorithm proposed in this paper and, for example, work by
Mhatre et al. [45] in which top down predictions from CA1 to
MEC continually update path integral information.
A key quantity in the combined estimate of hidden state, in
equation 24, is the Kalman gain Kn. This acts as a multiplier for
the prediction errors such that sensory modalities that are more
predictive of hidden state have higher gain. By changing the
sensory observation noise R one can change elements of the
Kalman gain. Indeed, our simulations on localisation showed that
it was necessary to increase the somatosensory noise Rt to the
extent that this modality was effectively ignored during localisation
(the component of the Kalman gain tended towards zero). In the
brain this would be manifested by a modulation of the connection
strength between somatosensory LEC and hippocampus.
Sensory imagery. During sensory imagery the architecture
in Figure 8 (top right) is used as the agent’s virtual reality engine.
The MEC receives virtual motor commands, un, from prefrontal
cortex, and uses path integration to update states, m n. The CA3-
CA1 to LEC pathway then produces predictions of sensory codes,
g (mn). This would therefore be consistent with recent findings that
the imagination of coherent scenes is hippocampus dependent
[64].
The above predictions (and state estimates mn) are then
(separately) propagated back down cortical hierarchies, creating
egocentric sensory imagery in lower-level regions of scene
construction networks [65]. In the simulations described earlier,
we (unrealistically) reduced these multiple stages of processing to a
single mapping g (mn).
Decision making. During decision making we envisage that
the architecture operates as in Figure 8 (bottom left). LEC receives
sensory goals, yn, and MEC receives virtual motor commands,
un, from prefrontal cortex. Sensory goals are then compared with
predicted sensory input, g (mn) from the CA3-CA1 to LEC
pathway. The likelihood of the data given the model is then
proportional to the sum-squared difference between yn and gn
(see equation 29). Previously, Fox and Prescott [66] have proposed
that septal regions, or projections to them, represent such
accumulated disparities. To compute a likelihood ratio this whole
process would have to happen twice, once for virtual motor
commands corresponding to a left turn and once for a right turn,
as described earlier. This is indicated by the thick line from
prefrontal to MEC in Figure 8 (bottom left).
Experimental data [67] shows that, when rats reach decision
points, potential routes are explored serially rather than in
parallel, which therefore suggests that evidence for a left versus a
right turn will be computed serially. To compute log-likelihood
ratios it will therefore be necessary to use working memory, as in
other delayed discrimination tasks. A possible neural subtrate for
this are mutual inhibition circuits that can encode the alternative
likelihoods [68], store them and make an appropriate decision
[69].
Figure 9. Motor and route planning. Route planning can be implemented using Forward inference, in which sensory goals are instantiated in
LEC (or projections to it), and the recurrent circuitry produces state estimates from path integration mn , and Bayesian estimation mn , that are
consistent with those goals. Backward inference takes as input the result of the forward sweep. It produces improved estimates of the hidden
states, given by the recursion m^n~ mnz J n(m^nz1{ mnz1), and estimates of control signals given by u^n~ Ln(m^nz1{ mnz1). We propose that
the prediction error m^nz1{ mnz1 is computed in MEC and propagated to CA3-CA1 for computation of m^n and to prefrontal regions for
computation of u^n . See equation 34 for more details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003383.g009
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Although we have modelled sensory goals as being represented
in LEC, it may well be the case that they are represented at lower
levels of cortical hierarchies. If this is the case, then the
discrepancy between sensory goals and predicted sensory input
would also occur at lower levels. The coarseness of these
representations, and thus their anatomical instantiation, are likely
to vary as a function of task requirements.
Model selection. During model selection we envisage that
the architecture operates as in Figure 8 (bottom right). LEC
receives observed sensory data, yn, and MEC receives efference
copy, un, from prefrontal cortex. Sensory observations are then
compared with predicted sensory input, g (mn), from the CA3-
CA1 to LEC pathway, to produce the prediction error signal
yn{ g (mn). The likelihood of the data given the model is then
proportional to the sum-squared prediction errors as shown in
equation 29. As described above for the decision making
simulations, these likelihoods may be represented in lower level
sensory cortices or as accumulated discrepancy signals projecting
to septal regions. Ratios of these likelihoods are used for deciding
which environment an agent is in, as described above.
The recurrent connections between CA3-CA1 and LEC (thick
lines in Figure 8 - bottom right) implement the agent’s model of its
environment. Different models will be instantiated in different
subsets of these connections. To compute likelihood ratios for
model selection, the above computations would have to be run
twice, once for each model (we propose that this happens in
parallel during ‘theta flickering’ - see below). The thick lines in
Figure 8 indicate that different subsets of these connections will be
engaged, corresponding to the different models.
Route and motor planning. During route and motor
planning we envisage that the underlying neural architecture
operates as described in Figure 9. This comprises separate phases
of forward and backward inference. During forward inference
LEC receives sensory goals, yn, and the CA3-CA1 to LEC
pathway produces predictions, g (mn). As there is no input at this
stage (virtual or efference copy), MEC state estimates are driven
solely by state dynamics mn~ Fnmn{1 eg. location estimates are
updated based on velocity and direction. The entorhinal-
hippocampal loop then iteratively updates the hidden state
estimates mn, using Bayesian estimation, so as to minimise the
discrepancy between sensory goals and predictions. The result is a
sequence of estimates mn for n~1::N which contains a putative
sequence of spatial locations that will lead to the sensory goal.
Backward inference then proceeds using just the spatial loop, as
shown in Figure 8 (right panel). That sensory goals do not need to be
instantiated at this stage is a consequence of using the gamma rather
than the beta form of the backward recursions (see Text S2). In the
absence of correlations between inputs and hidden states the update
formulae for these backward recursions are straightforward, and
given by equation 34. The backward estimates of the hidden states
are given by the recursion m^n~ mnz J n(m^nz1{mnz1) and the
control signals are estimated as u^n~ Ln(m^nz1{mnz1). One
possibility is that the prediction error (m^nz1{mnz1) is computed
in MEC and propagated to CA3-CA1 for computation of mn and
to prefrontal regions for computation of u^n, as depicted in Figure 9
(right panel). This proposed architecture is consistent with a
previous suggestion that, during navigation, cue information is
provided by LEC and action information by MEC [70].
Population Codes
As with other proposals that the brain may implement some
form of approximate Bayesian inference [71], to formally test this
idea it is necessary to have a proposal for how neural populations
represent uncertainty. Ma et al. [72], for example, have shown
how populations of cells can represent probability distributions
using probabilistic population codes in which simple linear
combinations of firing rates can implement Bayesian inference.
Beck at al. [73] have shown how such a scheme can implement
Kalman filtering.
As we have locally linearised the dynamic and observation
nonlinearities, the forward inference step in this paper closely
corresponds to Kalman filtering. It therefore seems plausible that
forward inference using EKF can be implemented using similar
principles. Thus, although equations 23 to 26 perhaps seem rather
removed from neurobiology there may well be a plausible neural
implementation.
It has yet to be demonstrated how the gamma recursions
underlying backward inference could be implemented using
probabilistic population codes. However, given that the gamma
recursions comprise an implementation of Bayes rule followed by a
marginalisation (see Text S2) whereas Kalman filtering is a
marginalisation followed by Bayes rule (see Text S2) we imagine a
similar instantiation is possible.
The Beck at al. [73] approach assumes that trial-to-trial
variability in population firing rates is in a class of distributions
from the linear-exponential family. This includes distributions
where cells have independent Poisson rates. There is good
evidence to suggest that MTL cell firing is not independent and
Poisson [74], but it is not known if their activity falls into the more
general linear-exponential family.
Other proposals as to how the brain might implement Bayesian
inference are specific to the hippocampus. One proposal [75]
suggests that higher certainty is encoded by spike patterns
containing more spikes and where the spikes are closer together.
If this is true then our perspective makes a number of simple
predictions. For example, because backward inference produces
higher certainty estimates than forward inference, backward
replays should produce burstier spike trains. This should be
simple to test using existing data [76].
Planning as Inference
An important part of our proposal is that the multiple tasks that
together comprise spatial cognition can all be implemented using
probabilistic inference in a single model. A caveat here is that our
approach is restricted to goal-direction navigation. Whilst the
forward inference in nonlinear dynamical systems that gives rise to
the EKF algorithm, has a long history in estimates of localisation,
there have been no proposals, to our knowledge, that also consider
planning. However, in the machine learning literature, similar
approaches for solving planning or control problems have been
developed under the generic term ‘Planning as Inference’. For
example, Attias [77] has proposed that planning problems can be
solved using Bayesian inference.
The central idea is to infer the control signals, un, conditioned
on known initial state, x1 and desired goal states xn. Similarly,
Toussaint [78] describes the estimation of control signals using a
Bayesian message passing algorithm which defaults to the classic
Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) for linear Gaussian dynamics.
Proposals have been made regarding how this Planning as
Inference framework maps onto neural architectures in the brain
[79,80].
A key difference to our proposal is that Toussaint solves a
closed-loop (feedback) control problem. This finds a mapping from
state-space to the optimal action, also known as the ‘policy’. In
terms of the underlying generative model in Figure 2, this requires
extra links from x n to un. In this paper we solve an open-loop
control problem. Our estimated control trajectory u^n is a set of
ballistic commands that cannot be updated in light of future
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information regarding the state of the system. Nevertheless, these
commands can be rapidly computed at arbitrary time scales ‘on
the fly’, and this type of control strategy may be sufficient for a
compliant motor system.
Learning
In our simulations the agent learnt to predict sensory input
using a pre-developed set of place cells with fixed centres and
widths. This allowed us to use a simple regression approach for
learning the basis function weights, which is similar to the standard
two-stage optimisation process in machine learning. In the first
stage basis functions are estimated in an initial unsupervised
learning phase (eg. based purely on MEC input), and basis
function weights are learnt in a second, supervised learning phase
[81].
Our simulations also assumed the agent had exact knowledge of
its hidden state during learning, whereas more realistic simulations
would also require the agent to infer these states. In principle this
requires a straightforward implementation of the Expectation-
Maximisation (EM) algorithm [38,82] for learning in dynamical
systems.
A more powerful alternative which integrates out the depen-
dence on model parameters in the forward and backward passes is
Variational Bayes (VB) [83,84]. Implementation of these VB
schemes would mean that the maximum likelihood approach
described in this paper would be replaced by a maximum evidence
approach. Agents would implement decision making, model
selection and motor planning by maximising the model evidence.
Given that VB approximates the model evidence using free
energy, the resulting scheme would then be broadly consistent
with the Free Energy Principle [85]. A further detail here is that in
previous applications of VB [83,84], backward inference was
implemented using the beta not the gamma recursions. In this
paper we propose that it is the gamma recursions that are
implemented in the brain, as they do not require storage of sensory
observation sequences.
Local Linearisation
The forward and backward algorithms are general purpose
computations which may be implemented in a number of ways
and this paper has focussed on an implementation based on local
linearisation. The benefit of this is that the state probability
distributions are Gaussian and so may be described with a small
number of parameters; means and covariances. Additionally, there
are analytic formulae for updating the parameters.
A drawback of the LL approach is that the true probability
distributions may be non-Gaussian. One possibility is that the
distribution over the agent’s location may be multimodal. This will
be the case when an agent is placed in a familiar environment at
an unknown location where there are multiple locations consistent
with sensory data. For this scenario inferential methods based on
sampling, such as particle filtering, would be more appropriate
[37].
A second concern is that a single iteration of forward and
backward inference may not be sufficient to find the controls that
maximise the planning likelihood p(unDx1,Y N ,E). It may be
possible to improve the estimated controls by running multiple
forward and backward replays such that the linearisation takes
place around a different and improved trajectory each time. This
iterated local linearisation would be analogous to the iterative
Local Quadratic Gaussian (iLQG) approach from control theory
[86].
This second concern may also be addressed by treating space as
discrete rather than continuous. In this perspective the agent is
currently located in one of a finite number of ‘bins’ each of which
may correspond to the support of a place cell. The optimal
trajectory through these bins can then be computed by solving a
discrete Bellman equation. Todorov has shown that this corre-
sponds to backward inference in a hidden Markov model [87].
This computation relies on a recursive high-dimensional update
that is perhaps readily suited to the massively recurrent nature of
CA3. These computations would be consistent with earlier
proposals that the hippocampus itself is suited for solving shortest
path problems [88].
Open-Loop Control
In regard to motor planning, this paper has described a forward
and backward inference procedure which allows an agent to solve
an open-loop control problem. This produces a control trajectory
that is a set of ballistic commands that cannot be updated in light
of future information regarding the state of the system. It is
possible to augment the generative model to include extra links
from states to actions, so that the agent instead learns a policy - a
mapping from states to actions, as in [78]. This would then
provide a solution to the closed-loop (feedback) control problem.
However, it may be the case that the mammalian brain solves
the closed-loop problem in two stages. First, the computational
power of recurrent networks in CA3 could be used to implement
forward and backward inference to solve the open-loop problem.
Estimated trajectories would then be replayed to ventral striatum
during quiet wakefulness or slow wave sleep. This is consistent with
an earlier model [89] and the observation of ripple activity
propagating to this region [90]. These replays would then be used
to train up a habitual dorsal striatal decision making system (see
[11] for a review of habitual versus flexible/deliberative systems
and their anatomy).
This is also consistent with proposals that for known environ-
ments, navigational control is gradually transferred from a flexible
inferential system to a habitual system based on a hippocampo-
striatal mapping [14]. Such a hippocampo-striatal model has
previously been proposed by Foster et al. [29].
Cognitive Control
This paper has described how the various aspects of spatial
cognition can be implemented using inference in a statistical
model. It has not, however, addressed the broader cognitive
control issues such as how internally generated goals are produced
or when to switch between localisation versus model selection
versus decision making modes. A recent computational framework
[22], called Information Foraging (IF), however, does address
some of these issues. This approach requires that agents compute
the information that will be gained by making spatial decisions,
which in turn requires the agent to have a probabilistic model of its
environment. Thus, it would be possible for both IF and the
Forward-Backward (FB) model to both use the same underlying
probabilistic model, with perhaps IF deciding when to run an
iteration of FB.
This paper has proposed how model-based control may be
implemented using spatial models implemented in hippocampal
circuits. But it has not addressed how the control of decision
making is arbitrated between, for example, model-based and
model-free controllers. An influential proposal here [15] is that
such arbitration is based on the confidence with which each system
can make a decision. Thus, model-based and model-free systems
can be combined by weighting each decision with their relative
confidence. The ‘Mixed Instrumental Controller’ [19] also makes
use of both types of decision making system. The model-based
system incurs a fixed computational penalty reflecting the fact that
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model-based decisions require time to reach. If the estimated
benefit of a model-based decision does not exceed this penalty then
control is given to the model-free controller.
Theta Sequences and Pattern Replay
The next and final section of this discussion summarises the
specific predictions of the model proposed in this paper. To put
these predictions in context we now briefly review two sets of
empirical findings. These are, firstly, the observations of ‘theta
sequences’ [91] which are sequential patterns of place cell firing
occurring whilst rats move about in their environment and theta
activity is recorded in hippocampus. The second set of observa-
tions are, again, sequential patterns of place cell firing but now
occurring during sleep or quiet wakefulness and when Sharp Wave
Ripples (SWRs) (henceforth ‘ripples’) [24] are recorded in
hippocampus.
The phenomenon of phase precession refers to the observation
[92,93] that place cells fire at gradually earlier phases of the
hippocampal theta rhythm as rats move through their place fields.
This is consistent with the notion of ‘theta sequences’ in which
place cells fire in sequence within a theta cycle. Theta sequences
have since been measured across cell-populations [91]. Addition-
ally, theta sequences which sweep forward in advance of a rat’s
current location have been observed and are especially noteworthy
at decision points in maze navigation. For example Johnson and
Redish [67] recorded the activity of neural ensembles in the dorsal
hippocampal CA3 region of awake behaving rats running in a T-
maze. They found that as rats reached a decision point,
representations swept predominantly forward from the current
location, first down the right path and then the left. This activity
did not occur in both forward directions simultaneously: the
representation first encoded one arm and then the other. Finally,
Gupta et al. [4] have shown that theta sequences represent
distances further ahead of a rat during acceleration and further
behind during deceleration, and that these sequences represent the
environment in ‘chunks’. A key feature of theta sequences is that
they are time-compressed, occurring at about 5 to 10 times the
speed of actual behaviour [91,93,94]. That is, were a rat to run
through an environment at a typical speed, it could activate the
same sequence of place cells, but would do so 5 to 10 times more
slowly.
We now turn to the discussion of ripple activity. In humans,
episodic memories are thought to be encoded by the Medial
Temporal Lobe (MTL) memory system. Information regarding
these memories can then be transferred to neocortex [95–97] and
a proposed mechanism of this transfer is the replay of episodes
during later waking or sleep [27] so that neocortical synaptic
plasticity can then act to strengthen cortico-cortical connections.
This replay activity has been observed primarily in rodents using
spatial navigation tasks [98] during ripples in Slow Wave Sleep
(SWS) [99] and quiet wakefulness. There is evidence that this
pattern replay is related to consolidation and transfer, as disrupting
ripples impairs performance in a spatial memory task [100].
Place cell sequences observed during awake ripples have been
observed to be played backwards. This is known as reverse replay.
Foster and Wilson [76], for example, recorded from cell ensembles
in dorsal CA1 hippocampus in awake behaving rats and detected
reverse replays after a rat had run the length of a 1D track. Similar
reverse replays that start immediately after navigation have been
observed on other 1D tracks [101], a linear path through a 2D
environment [102], a 2D open-field environment [103], and a two
choice T-maze [104]. Place cell sequences observed during awake
ripples have also been observed to be played forwards [101]. This
is known as forward replay.
Replay activity during ripples is also time-compressed, with
sequences being replayed within the duration of a single ripple
(50–250 ms). This corresponds to a compression factor of about 15
to 20 relative to the original behaviour [102].
The above forward and backward replays are also known as
‘local replays’ or ‘locally initiated replays’ so as to distinguish them
from another phenomenon known as ‘remote replay’ or ‘remotely
initiated replay’. This occurs when a rat replays an experience of
one place whilst being physically located in another. In one
experiment [105], rats were exposed to two different environments
which had the same physical structure (allocentric layout) but
differed in their set of visual cues. Replays of trajectories in one
maze were observed whilst the rat was located in the other.
Remote replay has also been observed [102,104] where rats
replayed activity corresponding to remote parts of the same
environment. As is the case with local replays, remote replays can
be forward or backward in time [104]. In general, replay activity
during ripples can be forward or backward, whereas theta
sequences are always forward.
Jadhav et al. [106] have interrupted awake ripples during
performance of a navigation task with alternating goals in a W-
shaped maze. Ripple disruption was found to affect decision
making on the outbound leg of the task, which required linking of
past information with current location. However, it did not affect
the inbound leg which required no such memory component
therefore providing evidence that awake ripples support spatial
working memory.
Finally, Dragoi and Tonegawa [107] have observed ‘preplay’
activity. Here, the sequence of place-cell firing during a novel
spatial experience occurred on a significant number of occasions
during the resting or sleeping period prior to that experience.
They propose that this activity organises hippocampal assemblies
into dynamical structures ready for subsequent associations with
sensory episodes.
Model predictions
This section summarizes the predictions of our model (the ‘FB
model’). We indicate where these predictions are unique to the
proposed model and where they are shared by others.
The hippocampus optimally combines sensory cues with
path integration. This prediction is not unique to the FB
model. It is shared for example by the conception of the
Hippocampus as a Kalman Filter [20]. Evidence for the related
hypothesis that humans optimally combine sensory cues with path
integration is provided in a behavioural study [108]. Given
behaviorial data on a rat navigating in a simple environment in
darkness and then in light, it should be possible to develop a spatial
model (mapping location to sensory cues) and then infer the
precision of sensory cues with respect to path integral input (ie.
how much noisier one is than the other). The principles of such an
investigation are the same as for the study of Bayesian sensory
integration in other domains eg. visual and haptic (for a review, see
[71]).
Local changes to an environment will produce
hippocampal prediction errors. Local changes to an envi-
ronment, such as objects being moved or disappearing, will be
reflected in greater ‘prediction error’ activity in layer 2 LEC cells.
This observation has in fact already been made in the reported
activity of ‘trace cells’ in LEC [49]. This prediction is not unique
to the FB model, however. It is common to all predictive coding
models which posit that connections from hippocampus to LEC
layer 5 convey predictions, and connections from LEC layer 2
convey prediction errors [23]. The model in Mhatre et al. [45] also
has this structure, although only predictions of medial rather than
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lateral EC are considered. These predictive coding models can be
traced back to earlier formulations by Gray and McNaughton
[109] (p. 243).
Theta sequences during decision making are driven by
prefrontal circuits. The FB model predicts that theta
sequences during decision making (a la Johnson-Redish [67]) are
driven by activity in prefrontal circuits. Moreover, different
populations of neurons will be engaged during left-turn versus
right-turn theta sequences. This prediction could be confirmed
using cell assembly recordings of prefrontal cortex in rat, or using
pattern recognition methods for decoding neuroimaging data in
human. This prediction is similar to an earlier proposal [32] that
suggested prefrontal regions signal virtual motor efference copy to
a spatial cognition system during sensory imagery.
Different populations of CA3/CA1 cells will become
active during model selection. It has long been proposed
that different environments are encoded using different popula-
tions of CA3/CA1 cells. Thus, during model selection, when an
agent is trying to figure out which environment it is in, we envisage
that these different populations will become active as they compete
to explain sensory observations. This has been observed in a recent
study by Jezek et al. [110] who familiarized a rat with two different
environments, which had identical allocentric layouts but different
sensory cues (wall markings). They were then able to electronically
switch the sensory cues. Immediately following these switches, two
different populations of CA3 cells flickered on and off until one
representation became stable. This is referred to as ‘theta
flickering’. The FB perspective on theta flickering is as follows.
By using the models developed in the investigation of sensory cue
integration (see above), it should be possible to predict how long
the flickering period endures. The end of the flickering period will
correspond to an above threshold likelihood ratio (see Figure 5).
This prediction is not unique to the FB model but would be
common to any dynamic Bayesian model of hippocampal activity,
such as Kalman or particle filtering [20,111].
Remote replays are algorithmic and support route and
motor planning. The replays observed during ripples are often
considered to be of previously experienced sequences from
episodic memory. We refer to this as the ‘episodic’ view. In
contrast, the FB model predicts that replays are not merely
previous experiences played forwards or backwards but are the
result of computations (the forward and backward recursions).
This perspective, which we might term ‘algorithmic’ rather than
‘episodic’ makes a number of specific predictions.
1. Because the function of remote replay is hypothesised to be
planning of spatial and motor trajectories then the interruption
of remote replay should result in poorer subsequent navigation
performance (speed,accuracy). This prediction is specific to the
FB model.
2. Backward replays should be similar but not identical to time-
reversed forward replays. This is illustrated in Figure 7. More
specifically, the backward replays are more direct than the
corresponding forward replays. That is, they describe shorter
trajectories from beginning to end. This prediction is specific to
the FB model.
3. The FB model predicts that reverse replays encode location
with higher spatial precision than the corresponding forward
sequences. Here, decoded locations are computed in a
backward replay, and FB predicts that the associated spatial
precisions will be higher than for the corresponding forward
replay. If spatial precision is reflected in higher density spike
trains [75] then reverse replays should contain higher density
spike trains than the associated forward replay. To our
knowledge this prediction is unique to the FB model.
4. Forward and backward replays should be paired in that a
backward replay starts from the end point of a forward replay.
The backward replays must therefore be initiated immediately
after completion of the corresponding forward replay. This
‘temporal pairing’ is a key prediction of the FB model but has
so far not been reported in the literature.
The pairing of forward and backward replays, referred to
above, would be evident when the following conditions are
satisfied (i) the agent is familiar with the environment, (ii) the
optimal route requires a chaining together of decisions, rather than
a single decision. This is illustrated for example in Figure 7 which
depicts route and motor planning. Given that the agent is initially
facing south, two decisions have to be made to reach the goal (turn
right and continue, rather than eg. turn right then right again).
This is to be contrasted, for example, with ‘decision making’ in
Figure 5, where a single decision is required to reach the goal. The
agent needs to be familiar with the environment for it to have
developed a model and planning is then based on this model. The
above conditions would be satisfied following minor reconfigura-
tions of a familiar environment, such as blockage of a familiar
route [112] or appearance of a shortcut [113]. Having updated its
model of the environment, an agent could then use forward and
backward replays to plan a new optimal route to goal.
A plausible alternative functional role for remote replay is that it
is involved in maintaining a memory representation of paths that
have not recently been experienced [5,104]. For example, reverse
replay might provide a mechanism for developing a navigationally
complete representation of an environment - one reflecting not
only trajectories experienced, but also the corresponding reverse
trajectories. There is also evidence, referred to earlier, that replays
during awake ripples are involved in spatial working memory
[106].
Just as we predict that backward replays will be more direct
than preceding forward replays, we also predict that later forward
replays will be more direct than preceding forward replays. This is,
however, predicated on forward and backward replays being
repeated iteratively (see ‘Local Linearisation’ above) and being a
signature of route planning. Later forward replays can then
become quite different to earlier forward replays and correspond
to much more direct paths. This prediction is consistent with
recent findings [104] where novel shortcut trajectories were
constructed during replay activity. It is also more generally
consistent with recent research [114] that replay activity is
involved in planning and is a predictor of subsequent behaviour.
Changes in effective connectivity. We now describe
predictions of the FB model that posit a change in effective
connectivity from one brain region to another. In humans this can
be assessed using functional neuroimaging and measures of
effective connectivity [115,116]. These human neuroimaging
experiments would use previously developed virtual reality
environments. Additionally, it is becoming easier to make
simultaneous electrophysiological recordings from multiple brain
regions in rats. To our knowledge the following predictions are
unique to the FB model.
The FB model predicts that theta sequences during decision
making (a la Johnson-Redish [67]) are driven by populations of
neurons in prefrontal circuits. We would therefore expect to see
increased effective connectivity from prefrontal to hippocampal
regions at decision points. The FB model predicts that task goals
during decision making are instantiated by increased connectivity
from PFC to LEC. We would therefore also expect an increase in
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effective connectivity from PFC to LEC during these decisions.
Additionally, which way to turn would be based on the
computation of a likelihood ratio, which we hypothesise will
employ the same PFC machinery as for other delayed discrimi-
nation tasks (see earlier section on decision making). We would
therefore expect to see increased effective connectivity from
hippocampus to PFC during decisions. The above predictions are
consistent with recent findings of changes in theta coherence in
hippocampal-prefrontal networks [117].
During sensory imagery (and decision making) we expect
greater prefrontal to hippocampal connectivity, as virtual efference
copy is proposed to drive activity in hippocampus. This proposal
has also been made in a previous model of spatial memory and
imagery [32]. During route and motor planning we expect
prefrontal to LEC connectivity to be increased so as to instantiate
task goals (same as for decision making above). Additionally, we
expect MEC to prefrontal connectivity to be increased so that
control signals can be estimated from the computed reverse path.
Conclusion
We have shown that the various computations underlying
spatial cognition can be implemented using statistical inference in
a single probabilistic model. Inference is implemented using a
common set of ‘lower-level’ computations involving forward and
backward inference over time. We have proposed a mapping of
the above computational processes onto lateral and medial
entorhinal cortex and hippocampal regions CA3-CA1. This
proposed mapping is consistent with recent findings in rat
electrophysiology, and other proposals that one function of the
hippocampus that is preserved across mammalian species, is that it
integrates spatial and non-spatial information. We have also
proposed that these computations are reflected in recent findings
of pattern replay in the mammalian brain. Specifically, that theta
sequences reflect decision making, theta flickering reflects model
selection, and remote replay reflects route and motor planning.
Many of the underlying hypotheses can be tested using existing
data.
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